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THE role that money, credit, and financial flows play in the
Soviet Union differs significantly from that in nonsocialist coun-
tries. For one thing, official Soviet economic theory has had
considerable trouble over the years in defending the very exis-
tence of money under socialism and in legitimizing the use of
credit and interest charges. For another, ever since the inaugura-
tion of the planned economy, Soviet economic policy has been
implemented by a combination of planning, direct allocation of
resources, and administrative controls that does not include any
independent role for money and monetary policy.
Soviet money performs its function in an economy character-
ized by differentiated markets and by a price system in which
price changes depend on administrative decisions rather than on
supply and demand factors. To achieve equilibrium conditions
and growth objectives, primary emphasis is placed on the admin-
istrative allocation of existing, as well as on the development of
additional, real resources; monetary management does not go
beyond assisting in the implementation of plans cast in physical
terms. Credit, too, is issued mainly for carrying required invento-
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Soviet Monetary Theory 37
policy regarding credit and monetary equilibrium, see chapters 6
and 8, respectively.
Soviet Monetary Theory
The economic literature of the Soviet Union has been character-
ized by a good deal of confusion about the nature of money, the
role of the monetary process, and the function of the banking
system. Undoubtedly, rigid official adherence to the theories of
Marx have hampered monetary analysis. Accepting such con-
cepts as interest charges and recognizing the monetary nature of
bank deposits have presented problems for the theoretician and
policy maker. In fact, a coherent theory underlying the manage-
ment of money by the socialist state has yet to be formulated.'
Soviet monetary theory has long been inhibited by its refusal to
recognize that Karl Marx's pronouncements on gold, circulation
of commodities, credit, and financial flows were derived from the
analysis of a specific, early stage in the development of the
capitalist economy and do not necessarily have the same validity
in a socialist economy.2 Still following Marx, who identified
money with gold and was blind to credit creation as a source of
deposit money and its equivalence to money of other origin,
Soviet theory considers fiduciary money and bank deposits to be
merely substitutes for gold. A typical treatise still proclaims that
"credit (paper) money in actual circulation in socialist countries
merely represents gold. The quantity of money in circulation is,
as a rule, limited by the demand of the national economy for real
money—gold."3
While a review of the early history of Soviet monetary theory is
largely irrelevant here, it is worth mentioning that the notion of
'For a brief review of the rate of economics as a science in the Soviet Union, see Nove
[137], Ch. 11.
20n this, see the section "Marxian Monetary Theory and Soviet Practice" in Spulber
[145], pp. 155—158. See also the interesting discussion by the late Hungarian economist
Varga [252].
3Aizenberg [1], p. 85. For a recent discussion of the role of gold in communist countries
and foreign exchange problems, see also Z. Atlas [162], Altman [214], and Wyczalkowski
[255]. In this connection, it is well to remember that under the Tsarist regime, paper
currency was called "credit notes" rather than money.
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separate payments circuits discussed in Chapter 6 is clearly trace-
able to the views of Preobrazhenski, perhaps the most influential
figure in the early period of Soviet economics. In 1918, he advo-
cated the disappearance of money from the state sector of the
economy, but after a brief interlude of War Communism the
indispensable role of money in the first state of "building social-
ism" was recognized, and by 1930, the theoretical basis of the
standard system, with its emphasis on the payments and control
functions of money, was firmly established.4
Soviet monetary theory does not deal with conditions of mone-
tary equilibrium or with models designed to estimate proper
growth rates of monetary aggregates. Official descriptions of the
role of money and credit have tended to emphasize technicalities
rather than substance. Soviet monetary literature deals almost
exclusively with the practical problems of controlling currency
circulation.Soviet monetary economists denied the mone-
tary nature of deposits at the State Bank, most of them viewing
such balances merely as a clearing fund, a liability of the Bank, or
a potential claim to currency.
That Soviet banks create credit in the same way as banks in
capitalist countries was recognized by L. Shanin as early as
but until the late 1940s Marxist orthodoxy prevailed. The
view that bank liabilities may be created also through lending
became respectable, if not generally accepted, only toward the
middle 1950s. But it was not until the middle 1960s that the theory
of the credit origin of money became widely held.6 After decades
of doctrinaire and often hair-splitting discussion, much of which
revolved around interpreting Marx's comments on money in the
context of a socialist economy, the view that deposits (or, in
Soviet terminology, balances of enterprises and of the Treasury at
the State Bank) do constitute money seems to have prevailed,
even though the debate is still
4For monetary views of early Soviet economists, see Roussel [248].
5His views appeared that year in a series of articles in the April, June, and July issues of
Ekonomicheskoye Obozrenie.
theory was advanced by Steinshleger, Pessel', Kronrod, Levchuk, Sitnin,
Shwarz, Melkov (see Bibliography) and accepted by the veteran monetary economist Z.
Atlas, who is responsible for the section on "The Credit Character of the Creation of
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The Soviet monetary system is a classical case of managed fiat
money, the volume of which is regulated directly and effectively
by state authority through a wide range of controls, including a
foreign exchange monopoly.7 Official claims that all domestic
money is "fully backed by material values" or that the ruble is
"adequately secured by gold and other precious metals and
stones"8 merely prove the survival of outdated monetary theories
of pre-Soviet vintage. The 25 percent cover of gold and other
precious metals and stones which bank notes are supposed to
have, however, is now given little emphasis by Soviet authorities,
while it is stressed that the backing of currency issued by both the
State Bank and the Treasury consists in "goods owned by the
state and salable at fixed prices."
The monetary unit created in 1922 (see Chapter 2,p. 27)re-
mained unchanged until 1947, when a currency conversion similar
to those undertaken by several Western European countries was
effected after the war. It was designed to deal with an inflationary
situation aggravated by a liquidity overhang created by wartime
developments, including war financing. In addition to the general
problem of excess consumer purchasing power held in the form of
currency hoards, a special distributive problem existed in the
Soviet Union: a large part of the excess currency was concen-
trated in the hands of the peasants as a result of sales of foodstuffs
at "free" prices (usually considerably above those fixed for simi-
lar items sold in state or cooperative stores on the basis of ration
cards issued after 1941 to the urban population). The conversion
aimed at a reduction of this overhang of purchasing power with-
'One of the earliest, clearest, most succinct, and, at the same time, sophisticated
statements on the credit origin of money, the nature of cash balances, and the role of money
in the Soviet economy may be found in Sitnin's booklet [78]. See also Melkov [61], Ch. 2,
for a review of the positions taken by various Soviet economists on the relationship of the
money supply to bank credit. Konnik [47], Ch. 4 and Levchuk [53].
In 1971, it was still necessary for an economist of the State Bank to justify the use of the
term "loanable funds" and to raise, for the first time since the creation of the monobank
system, the question of bank liquidity and its determinants: Levchuk [58], pp. 211—213.
8Paper currency was originally issued by the Ministry of Finance (since 1924) as well as
by the State Bank. The former issued the smaller denominations (up to 5 rubIes prior to the
currency exchange of 1961) and the latter, bank notes of larger denominations. Currently,
the Ministry of Finance issues only coins. Trubenkev [87], p. 13.40 Money in a Centrally Directed Economy
out which the abolition of rationing of consumer goods, promul-
gated simultaneously, would not have been possible.
In the 1947 conversion currency in circulation was reduced to
an amount just adequate to meet payroll requirements for one
income period. It was assumed that (a) almost the full amount of
wages and salaries disbursed would be spent in trade and service
establishments and returned to the State Bank at the end of the
period, and that (b) much of the remainder would be recaptured
through savings banks, both of which would be available for
meeting the next week's wage bill. Analysis of the relevant
monetary and expenditure aggregates suggested that the amount
of currency actually in circulation9 was ten times larger than this
amount, and a conversion rate of 1:10 was chosen. The con-
version was not announced in advance. It was undertaken at the
end of a pay period (December 14), when currency holdings in
the hands of the population could be expected to be at a minimum.
Given the purpose of the currency conversion, no simultaneous
change in wage rates or prices were required. Wage rates
remained unchanged and enterprise bank balances were not sub-
ject to reduction, since they could be adjusted as needed by
administrative action. Balances held by producers' cooperatives
and kolkhozes were converted at the same one-to-ten ratio that
applied to currency held by the general population.
The value of the financial assets held by the population—
government bonds and savings deposits—was reduced simultane-
ously with currency conversion, but at rates more favorable than
the currency exchange rate in order to discourage currency
hoarding in the future. A relative advantage was given to small
savings deposits.
The currency exchange effective January 1, 1961,10 in which
ten old rubles were exchanged for one new ruble, may be com-
pared with the shift to a "heavy" currency (such as the "heavy
franc") undertaken by several Western countries. In these coun-
tries the exchange for a new currency took place over a period of
time, without limitations, and was announced several months in
advance. The corresponding reductions in all claims against banks,
in other claims and assets, and in wages and prices were not
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designed to have any real effects on the economy, and particu-
larly not to reduce its liquidity. However, in the Soviet Union,
forcing concealed currency hoards into the open was a major
purpose of the conversion.
Money: A Passive Planning Tool
From its very beginning, Soviet planning has been based on
material balances in which specific kinds of physical resources are
allocated in order to achieve goals defined in real units." The
basic consumption-investment decisions are made by the state.
Production targets are set by the government and embodied in
specific directives cast in the form of output plans.
The state-owned sector, which accounts for practically the
entire nonagricultural production, consists of administratively
independent units ("enterprises") whose manager ("director") is
appointed by higher-echelon economic organizations, such as
regional or industry branch organizations,currentlycalled
ob'edineniye (see Ch. 5, footnote 27). The director is responsible
for meeting all—including the financial—plan targets after the
plan has been approved by the supervisory administration which,
however,, can make changes after the plan becomes effective.
Managers are permitted to increase profits significantly only by
raising productivity, but are allowed to have a voice in the
allocation of profits. Before the 1965 Reform, only an insignificant
part of profits determined by formula was retained by the enter-
prise generating them. While nominally increasing the enter-
prise's discretion in disposing of profits, the Reform in actuality
did little to increase the firm's autonomy in this area.
Once output plans are set, designated government agencies
(typically, ministries responsible for individual industries) spec-
ify, for each enterprise or group of enterprises, types and sources
of inputs, destination and prices of outputs, and channels of
distribution for the outputs. Until limited experimentation with
ItFor one of the earliest discussions of this topic, see Montias [245].Seealso Hirsch
[120]. Hirsch points out that the directive effects of money "are merely derived from the
preceding fundamental material decisions, that they achieve nothing but the optimal
execution of the prescribed basic material concept of the plan by consistent measurement
and by allocation of economic divisible quantities accordingly.".42 Money in a Centrally Directed Economy
more flexible policies was begun in 1965, individual enterprises
had little scope for deciding between alternative inputs and
outputs or investment decisions.
While centrally planned economies are quantity-oriented rather
than value-oriented, they do require money to avoid the cumber-
someness of barter.
In a socialist economy, money acquires the additional function
of a planning tool, albeit a passive one. To use Brzeski's expres-
sion, money is "an organization input in the process of social
production."2 Money enters economic planning mostly as a
common denominator for the purpose of aggregation. It facilitates
planning by making different activities comparable. Associated
financial categories, such as credit and interest, are merely techni-
cal devices for implementing central command ("planning")
decisions.'3
Shortages of money cannot be permitted to interfere with the
attainment of output targets. At the same time, holdings of extra
cash must be prevented from becoming effective demand for
labor, raw materials, and other ("funded") inputs in short supply.
Since some maneuvering within administratively set limits is
possible, the general tendency under the standard system was to
convert redundant cash balances into inventory.
The fact that an economic process is programmed in terms of
real magnitudes does not necessarily mean that it has no mone-
tary aspects whatever.'4 These monetary aspects are important,
but only in a global, macroeconomic sense. Once the macromone-
tary decisions are taken, what remains is implementation. Much
of what appears to be monetary action is, in fact, the exercise of
administrative functions by the banking system in support of
policies formulated elsewhere. Monetary flows recorded by the
banking system reveal deviations from planned real flows and
mirror any cumulative disequiibria and bottlenecks in the real
processes. Actual performance measured by comparing payments
flows with plan figures provides a day-to-day check on the econ-
omy—indeed, the only overall check.
Money thus performs an important function as a signal, but is
'2"Forced-Draft Industrialization in Poland," in [118], p. 23.
'3Typical Soviet textbooks refer to money as facilitating planning, control of production,
and unified and universal accounting. See, for instance, Bogachevsky's textbook [141.
'4See Ames [99], p. 172.
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not relied on to any significant degree as an adjuster. Credit policy
is not used as a means of affecting aggregate demand through
varying the cost and availability of credit or by manipulating
quantity of money and its composition. Instead, demand
money is controlled by administrative means—this mechanism
differentiates the Soviet system from the market allocation of
credit.Administrative decisions,rather than market adjust-
ments, are relied upon to correct deviations from planned per-
formance (targets), to remove bottlenecks, and to correct for
any disequilibria that might develop. These decisions are made by
the various economic planning and administrative agencies (the
"economic organs"), not by the monetary authorities.'5 How-
ever, all deviations from planned performance are first signalled
by the monetary flows recorded by the banking system.
Financial Planning
Soviet financial planning has failed thus far to integrate planning
on the microeconomic (enterprise) and the macroeconomic level.
Financial plans prepared for individual enterprises and units of
the state sector are aggregated for planning and monitoring pur-
poses (by industry branch, intermediate units of the economic
administration, and territorial subdivision), but are integrated
neither within a comprehensive national financial plan nor the
monetary plans of the State Bank.'6
The monetary plans that provide the operating basis of the two
main departments of the State Bank are the "Credit Plan" (Credit
'51t is, perhaps, significant that in Economics of Soviet Planning [103],byAbram
Bergson, one of the leading authorities on the Soviet Economy, there is no chapter on
money and banking, and only a perfunctory reference to the banking system: "Another
major agency concerned with credit and finance after the Ministry of Finance is the State
Banic" (p. 38). Even in Nove's widely used The Soviet Economy [137], fewer than four out
of the more than 330 pages of the revised edition are devoted to banking and credit. In a
chart showing the "organization and powers of central agencies for planning and managing
the Soviet economy," Zaleski [157], p. 25, does not include either the State Bank or the
Ministry of Finance. College textbooks similarly ignore the role of money and banking.
See, for instance, Turgeon [150], although the gap was filled in the second edition.
Compare Grossman, "Gold and the Sword: Money in the Soviet Command Economy" in
Rosovsky [143].
'60n the possible use of banking statistics and for a detailed review of the information
contained in the various payment documents for economic planning and forecasting, see
Belkin [12].44 Money in a Centrally Directed Economy
Department) and the "Currency" or "Cash" Plan (Cash Depart-
ment). The first combines short-term lending with long-term
credit, which has shown rapid growth in recent years. While the
inventory needs of the state sector can be derived from enterprise
financial plans, other credit needs are difficult to ascertain (funds
needed to finance the collection float, for example). The Credit
Plan on all territorial levels—local, regional and central—is thus
acombination of identifiable credit requirements projected from
past inventory patterns and educated guesses by State Bank
officials of the additional amounts required to bridge the collec-
p
tion gap, as well as various other unforeseen needs; it is not
broken down on a quarterly basis. The annual Credit Plan is
roughly comparable to the global credit ceilings established from
timeto time by some central banks of Western Europe.
The "Currency" Plan provides the basis for the other main
activityof the State Bank—control of currency in circulation. It is E
derivedfrom a sources-and-uses-of-funds account of the house-
hold sector. This account, known as the "Balance of Money
Incomeand Expenditures of the Population," has two parts. The
first shows income received from state enterprises, various orga- uo
nizations, government units, and transfer payments from the
budget; the second, transactions within the household sector
(such as purchase of second-hand goods) and between households
and kolkhozes (mainly the purchase of food in the free market).
Efforts to identify and increase "sources" of State Bank spc
resources, such as kolkhoz deposits, which figure so prominently J0
in th'e official pronouncements an& literature, must be interpreted
as a survival of misconceptions about the credit-creating power of
the banking system, or as an effort to keep to a minimum addi-
tional currency issue caused by credit expansion, or both.
As to financial planning on the micro level, each enterprise
operates on the basis of a financial plan which summarizes and
expresses in value terms the content of an underlying economic
plan formulated in physical terms. The director of the enterprise is
responsible for the execution of the plan, which details the enter-
prise's relationship with the national economic plan, including the
disposition of its social income, or surplus.
Lack of differentiation makes it impossible to trace separately
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o046 Money in a Centrally Directed Economy
capital, and gross additions to social infrastructure (public invest-
ment, in the Western sense). Table 3.1 shows this lack of differen-
tiation at the enterprise level with a summary (using illustrative
figures) of the sources and uses of funds in a typical enterprise
under the standard system as it was before the 1965 Reform.
Financial transfers by the enterprise are shown in rows 9 to 11.
They consist of payments of part of the profits into the budget,
interest payments, and repayments of bank loans (which, prior to
the Reform, were charges against gross profits). Rows ito 8 cover
internal uses of funds.
It is peculiar to Soviet enterprise accounting that the difference
between planned and actUal expenditures for investment (col-
umns 4 and 5) are considered a source of funds, as are economies
achieved in estimated construction expenditures. These sources
supplement the depreciation allowances available to finance fixed
investment provided for in the central economic plan (line1,
column 12). Another part of the depreciation reserves, together
with a deduction from profits and the proceeds from the sale of
redundant equipment ("unnecessary property"),isused to
acquire equipment and to finance minor construction projects not
provided for in the plan. These sources of "decentralized invest-
ments" are channeled through one of the special funds (row 4)
that the enterprise freely used before the Reform as part of the
less differentiated "enterprise" or "directors" fund. Rows 5 and
8 show funds that channel part of the profits into collective
consumption of the enterprise, while row 6 represents another
special fund, also derived from retained profits, which provides
incentive payments (premiums) for the staff. In the case illus-
trated by Table 3.1, working capital is increased by profits, by a
rise in economic receivables, and a reduction in unneeded work-
ing capital (columns 2, 8, and 9, respectively). Note that no use of
short-term credit is shown, although the use of long-term credit is
illustrated.
Since monetary and credit flows are planned as the counter-
parts of physical flows, financial plans are by necessity derivative.
On the one hand, they register and project the effects of planned
changes in the level and structure of output and prices on money
supply, credit, and investment financing. On the other, they
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"financial plan fulfillment' '—to what extent plan targets are being
met. Where "real plans" are the result of compromises among the
various central and regional economic and political agencies, the
related financial plans reflect automatically the goals set and the
compromises struck in these original plans.'7
In the broadest sense, the unified budget is the most compre-
hensive financial planning document, sinceitspecifies the
amounts of investment grants and credit through the intermedia-
tion of the banking system. The other financial plans are, in effect,
little more than statements of sources and uses of funds. Some
are nothing more than incomplete projections of prospective
operations, frequently for periods no longer than one quarter,
subject to continuous review and adjustment. Except for the
budget, all financial plans are internal documents, so that no
outside analysis of their relationship to actual performance is
possible.
Adjustments in financial plans, for the longer run as well as in
midstream, are made through administrative decisions. They may
include changes in growth patterns, as well as adjustments to deal
with dislocations and bottlenecks in situations where some enter-
prises (or economic or geographic sectors) fail to meet plan
targets while others manage to exceed them.
The Reform of 1965 has not abolished financial planning, but
has made it more flexible and less detailed. Central planning of the
broad categories of credit use continues, with the aim of preserv-
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'7Financial planning serves a number of specific needs, but so far it has not resulted in
the creation of a comprehensive, all-encompassing financial plan that would serve to guide
and monitor the progress of growth and the preservation of overall monetary equilibrium.
One of the obstacles to the construction of such a plan is the fact that the kolkhoz sector
remains outside of central financial planning.
The precise role of financial plans in economic planning remains an area of controversy
and considerable confusion among Soviet economists, and views differ as to their practical
significance. See, for instance, Alexandrov [2], Ch. 2; Allakhverdyan [98]; Batyrev,
Kaganov, and Yagodin [II], Ch. 4; Margolin [59], Ch. 1; Shenger [74]; and Zverev [931.
"Fordetails, see Allakhverdyan [98] and [1611, Isaev [42], Lyando [56], Margolin [591
Plotnikov [68], Ch. 3, Slavnyi [79], and Usoskin [89]. For an official Soviet presentation in
English, see Dundukov, "Financial Balances," in [151]. See also Berliner's pioneering
study [218], Lushin [55], and Garvy [117] and "The Role of the State Bank in Soviet
Planning in Degras" [110]. For a brief history of monetary planning by the State Bank, see
Melkov [611, pp. 92—97.48 Money in a Centrally Directed Economy
The Limited Role of Prices dollar) or in ruble
with other sociali
Prices depend on administrative decisions rather than on supply according to varj(
and demand factors.'9 They are manipulated by the government tion—whether su
as a means of distributing the social product within a broad which the
framework of economic policy. cases, depend on
The authorities set all consumer prices as well as transfer prices (usually a ministr3
for producers' goods and raw materials. They arrive at their price tion) responsible
determinations by adding centrally set (average) profit margins Goods are exi
and (mostly average) distribution margins to production costs, abroad. When
with no regard to demand or depletion. Goods, from raw mate- difference is abso:
rials to final products, are traded on the basis of price lists issued ence between th
by central planners (the Price Committee attached to the State imports and their
Planning Committee), which contain about five million individual the required pri
prices. In 1972 alone the Price Committee had reviewed about amounts accumu
400,000individualprices. ers, the domestic
Since stable prices facilitate planning and an orderly distribu- borne by the bud
tion and redistribution of the national product, major revisions are The Soviet pr
undertaken reluctantly and only at infrequent intervals. A system- rational allocatio
atic review is usually undertaken to implement new major policy and exports, or
decisions regarding costing and pricing, or to maintain or change some Soviet ecoi
price relationships between individual goods or commodity system as one o
groups. The basic price revision following World War II resulted resources. There:
in wholesale price lists issued in January 1949, which were capital and, to so
revised in 1955. The next and more sweeping revision was not cant part of the 1
undertaken until 1967, after the Reform, which introduced a shifted from a lit
charge on capital assets, was launched. Individual price adjust- factor cost pricin
ments are made typically to cope with shortages of specific goods ever, recalculatio
(and, in some cases, with consumer dissatisfaction) rather than as quasi rents did
a systematic reaction to eèonomic impulses received through the system.
market. Occasionally, individual prices are and profit Broad adjustiT
margins on certain categories of products adjusted, primarily in of wholesale prii
order to reduce differentials that are obviously illogical and cause general price rev
misallocation of resources. But no changes.
Export prices are divorced from the domestic price level and central price sett
may be specified in a convertible currency (usually the u.s. that would
200n1y the net receip
'°For the rationale and technique of price setting, see Malafeev [57], Smirnov [81], and domestic payments Cif
Zverev[93]. See also Bornstein [222] and Denis and Lavigne [111]. Soviet economy, see Pnomy
than on supply
thegovernment
t within a broad
as transfer prices




























The Limited Role of Prices 49
dollar) or in rubles. In the second case (usually in trade exchanges
with other socialist countries) applicable prices are differentiated
according to various factors characterizing the particular transac-
tion—whether subsidies and premiums are involved, the time at
which the original transaction was entered into—and in some
cases, depend on the particular export (or import) organization
(usually a ministry or its subordinated or special-purpose organiza-
tion) responsible for the transaction.
Goods are exported at prices that make them competitive
abroad. When such prices are lower than domestic costs, the
difference is absorbed by a special fund which receives the differ-
ence between the price the domestic purchaser must pay for
imports and their foreign costs (converted at the official rate). If
the required price-equalization export subsidies exceed the
amounts accumulated from corresponding payments by import-
ers, the domestic cost of balancing foreign payments is ultimately
borne by the budget.2°
The Soviet price system is thus an inadequate guide for a
rational allocation of resources between domestic consumption
and exports, or for determining the pattern of trade. Indeed,
some Soviet economists have long recognized the existing price
system as one of the impediments to an optimal allocation of
resources. Therefore, restructuring prices to allow for the cost of
capital and, to some extent, for natural rents constituted a signifi-
cant part of the 1965 Reform. The basis for price setting has been
shifted from a literal interpretation of the labor theory of value to
factor cost pricing with fixed and largely uniform markups. How-
ever, recalculation of prices to allow for the capital use charge and
quasi rents did not lead to a restructuring of the entire price
system.
Broad adjustments were made during the 1967 general review
of wholesale prices and again in 1970, resulting, as in previous
general price revisions, in the issuance of new official price lists.
But no changes were made in the principles and procedures of
central price setting; instead of the introduction of flexible prices
that would respond to supply, and demand conditions, a set of
200n1y the net receipts from, or cost of, foreign trade (and service transactions) enter the
domestic payments circuit. For further discussion of the impact of foreign trade on the
Soviet economy, see Pryor [141].50 Money in a Centrally Directed Economy
fixed and immutable prices remained applicable until the next
cycle of systematic general price revisions. The new cost factors
were allowed for, without revising the basic approach to the
pricing of other factors and without correcting the numerous
distortions embodied inexisting wholesale prices.Neither
did raising the average profit markup to 15 percent of prime costs
(with greater variations by industry, industrial branch, and even
individual enterprise) constitute a significant change, although the
resulting increase in wholesale prices (not passed on to retail
level) did reduce the number of enterprises requiring subsidies.
One argument for not departing from the principle of fixed
prices—in contrast to freeing some price categories either entirely
or within stipulated ranges, as in Hungary and some other social-
ist countries—has been to contribute to a stable environment in
which managers of individual enterprises can learn to operate
without detailed direction from the central authorities. Frequent
administrative changes in prices can play havoc with the planning
process. Thus, price lists reflecting revisions effective January 1,
1970 were issued too late to be taken into account in developing
the economic plan for that year. The plan was formulated in 1969,
with the result that the structure of production in the 1970 plan did
not reflect the new price relationships. Interenterprise sales were
complicated by the need to carry supplementary accounts to
adjust for the differences in the two sets of prices. All billing was
in 1969 prices to permit control of plan fulfillment, and the differ-
ence between new and old prices required additional settlements
between buyer andsellerthat were enteredinseparate
accounts.2'
One significant objective of the Soviet price system has been to
keep prices of producer's goods low in relation to those of con-
sumer goods. This policy, rootedin a doctrinaire application of the
Marxian analysis, has been pursued consistently since the first
Five-Year Plan. It was not modified by the Reform beyond the
indirect effects of allowing for the cost of capital. In some cases,
however, this change had far-reaching effects, since capital-out-
put ratios are typically high in producer's goods industries and
many extractive industries. The question of applying the turnover
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51 The Limited Role of Prices
tax to producer's goods has also been raised, but so far the
Reform has not gone beyond recognizing capital as a cost
factor. Nevertheless, the increase in machinery and equipment
prices can be viewed, together with the introduction of the capital
use tax, as an essential move to counteract one of the most basic
weaknesses of the Soviet economy—the wasteful use of capital
goods and the general tendency to plan for, and carry, excess
capacity.
Before the Reform, when no charge was made for capital
because it was public property, considerable misallocation and
wasteful use of investment funds resulted, as greater investment
per unit of output was not automatically reflected in higher costs.
Introduction of quasi rents and of differentiated capital charges
has frequently resulted in narrowing the considerable differences
in profit rates within the same branch of industry and among
its individual products.22 By introducing a capital use tax and
rental payments, the Reform changed the relative as well as the
absolute cost of goods.
The introduction of markdowns on slow-moving consumer
goods was an innovation which acknowledged that inferior or out-
of-fashion items could no longer be forced on goods-starved
consumers. It became part of the State Bank's lending policy to
exert pressure on retail organizations to trim inventories, which in
some cases results in sales at a loss (a typical concomitant of
relatively low retail markup margins).
The failure of the Reform to come to grips with the problem of
price formation sets definite limits on the ability of planning
authorities to optimize resource input and of all branches and
levels of the economic administration to evaluate performance by
individual enterprises and industries.23
22Shortly before the Reform was initiated, it had been planned to reduce freight tariffs
by 20 percent, since under the old system of cost accounting the 1964profitsof the Soviet
railway system amounted to 67.2 percent of direct costs. When allowance is made for a
charge for fixed and working capital, this profit ratio drops to 12.6 percent, less than the
national average for all state-owned enterprises. (It was eventually decided to leave freight
tariffs unchanged.) See Kondraschev [184]. See also Mitel'man [193].
231n the words of the director in charge of the credit department of the State Bank prior
to and after the Reform, "The fact that prices for many products of industry and agriculture
do not correspond to the amount of required social labor is a serious obstacle to the use of
cost accounting, as audited by the staff of the State Bank, as a tool for analyzing economic
processes by the Bank." Barkovsky [168], p. 40.